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This study compares motives and constraints to the recognition choice related to reporting 
zero goodwill impairment of Malaysian listed firms with those of Singaporean listed firms 
from 2010 to 2012. Using a binary logistic regression, results reveal important differences 
with regards to potential drivers and constraints to the recognition choice by listed 
companies between the two ASEAN countries. The Singaporean results appear to suggest 
that the recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment is driven by the 
desire to avoid debt covenant violation, whereas a high ratio of independent directors on the 
audit committee appears to restraint such recognition choice. Conversely, the Malaysian 
results seem to suggest that firms chose to exercise the recognition choice when the relative 
size of goodwill is small. However, the length of the CEO tenure appear to lessen such 
recognition choice. The findings of this study contributes to the literature on IFRS and 
accounting harmonization by supporting the view that having similar accounting standards 
may not necessarily imply that the financial statements of listed firms in the two countries 
are entirely comparable. Other factors, in particular, firms’ reporting incentives and the 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms play important roles in influencing the 
financial statement comparability. The study also provides important implications for 
policy makers and relevant authorities, in that, to improve the comparability of the financial 
statements in the two ASEAN countries, the relevant authorities need to closely monitor 
firms’ reporting incentives and further strengthen the corporate governance mechanisms.  
 









1. Introduction  
There is an increasing interest from various parties including standard-setters, regulators, 
and academics concerning the harmonisation of accounting standards through the revision 
of International Accounting Standards (IAS) and the implementation of the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (Baker & Barbu, 2007; Yip & Young, 2012). For 
example, Rezaee et al. (2010) conducted a study regarding the perception of practitioners 
and academics in the United States of America (US) concerning the convergence to a set of 
global accounting standards. The study found that, overall, the respondents view effective 
convergence to a set of global accounting standards to be beneficial to various stakeholders 
because it helps global investors in comparing financial information from various countries.  
 
However, prior studies (e.g., Ball et al., 2003) argue that there are other factors, such as 
level of discretion inherent in the IFRS, firms’ reporting incentives and strength of the 
enforcement of the IFRS that may affect the comparability of financial statements. As an 
example, a study undertaken by Ball et al. (2003) documented that incentives play 
influential role in the in the implementation of accounting standards in four East Asian 
countries, namely, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. 
 
Accordingly, two conflicting views on the application of a uniform set of accounting 
standards exist in the accounting literature. The perspective of the IASB and its proponents 
is that the application of the same accounting method by firms across countries helps in 
improving financial statement comparability (Cascino & Gassen, 2015). Another 
perspective is that mandating firms to apply a set of uniform accounting standards does not 




necessarily result in improved financial statement comparability (McLeay & Neal, 1999; 
DeFond et al., 2011). Factors, such as implementation credibility and reporting incentives, 
play important roles leading to improvement in the financial statements comparability (Ball 
et al., 2003; DeFond et al., 2011). 
 
To date, research on IFRS implementation in ASEAN countries focus mainly on a single 
country study (Perera & Baydoun, 2007; Abdul Majid, 2013; Wan Ismail et al., 2013; 
Abdul Majid, 2015). This study attempts to address this gap by analyzing the 
implementation of IFRS related to goodwill impairment in two countries that belong to the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). This study compares motives and 
constraints to the recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment of 
Malaysian listed firms with those of Singaporean listed firms from 2010 to 2012. The 
present study selected Malaysia and Singapore as institutional settings for the analysis of 
the recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment because they are the 
two ASEAN countries that have fully implemented IFRS related to goodwill impairment 
(i.e., IFRS 3 Business Combinations and IAS 36 Impairment of Assets). The two countries 
differ in terms of their economic and capital market development in that Singapore is 
categorized as an advanced economy while Malaysia is classified as an emerging economy. 
 
The regression results reveal that listed firms in both countries appear to have different 
potential drivers and constraints to the recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill 
impairment. The findings of this study contributes to the literature on IFRS and accounting 
harmonization by providing evidence and hence supporting the view that firms’ reporting 




incentives and the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms play important roles 
in influencing the financial statement comparability. 
Motives and constraints to the recognition choice 
 
In this paper, the motives and constraints to the recognition choice related to reporting zero 
goodwill impairment are examined by testing four main hypotheses - debt hypothesis, CEO 
reputation, ownership concentration and corporate governance mechanism. 
  
Debt hypothesis 
Because the decision to report goodwill impairment loss is not an income increasing 
accounting method, prior studies analysing firms’ motives for reporting goodwill 
impairment posits that companies that are close to violating their debt covenants will be 
less likely to report goodwill impairment loss (Beatty & Weber, 2006: 265) or they will 
tend to avoid reporting timely goodwill impairment loss (Ramanna & Watts, 2012).  
Consistent with the debt hypothesis, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, the higher the LEVERAGE, the higher the likelihood of recognisng 
zero goodwill impairment. 
 
CEO reputation 
The aim here is to analyse whether the decisions made by top management in recognising 
zero goodwill impairment are influenced by the desire to protect their reputation. Prior 
studies argue that existing top management may not have reported goodwill impairment 
loss (by reporting zero goodwill impairment) when the companies’ market values is lower 




than the book values of the net assets because of concern for their reputation (Beatty & 
Weber, 2006; Masters-Stout et al., 2008; Ramanna & Watts, 2012). 
 
In the present study, CEO tenure is employed as a proxy for CEO reputation. Similar to the 
prior studies, the following hypothesis is formulated:    
H2: Ceteris paribus, the longer the CEOTENURE, the higher the likelihood of recognisng 




Prior studies posit a negative association between ownership concentration and accounting 
method choice (Dhaliwal et al., 1982; Niehaus, 1989). That is with small ownership 
interest, shareholders may lack the incentives to monitor the managers, which in turn 
resulted in greater discretion being exercised by the managers. 
 
Consistent with the prior studies, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H3: Ceteris paribus, the higher the ownership concentration (OWNCON), the lower the 
likelihood of recognisng zero goodwill impairment. 
 
Corporate governance mechanism 
 
One of the corporate governance mechanisms that has been examined by prior studies (e.g., 
Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008) is audit committee independence. Prior studies (e.g., 




Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008) argue that corporate governance mechanisms are effective 
when the ratio of independent audit committee members is high (AUDITCOM). 
 
Similar to the prior studies, the following hypothesis is formulated:    
H4: Ceteris paribus, the higher the proportion of audit committee members who are 
independent (AUDITCOM), the lower the likelihood of recognisng zero goodwill 
impairment. 
 
2.  Research methods  
 
2.1 Logistic regression model  
 
To compare the motives and constraints to the recognition choice related to reporting zero 
goodwill impairment by Malaysian and Singaporean listed firms, this study extends the 
model as developed by Abdul-Majid (2016) by incorporating country variable into the 
following logistic regression model: 
 




= The recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment. 
It is a dichotomous variable, which is equal to one for the test group, and 
zero for the control group. 
LEVERAGE = Debt ratio, measured as total debts at the end of prior year divided by 
total assets at the end of prior year. 
CEOTENURE = CEO tenure is based on the number of years that the CEO has held the 
position. 




OWNCON = Ownership concentration refers to the number of ordinary shares held 
by the five largest shareholders, divided by the total number of issued and 
paid up ordinary shares. 
AUDITCOM = The proportion of independent nonexecutive directors on the audit 
committee. 
GWB = Relative size of goodwill balance is measured as opening goodwill 
balance in the current year divided by total assets at the end of prior year. 
∆OCF = Change in operating cash flows from prior year to current year, divided 
by total assets at the end of prior year 
SIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of prior year 
BTM = Book-to-market ratio, computed as book value of equity divided by 
market value of equity at the end of current year. 
 
Source: Abdul Majid (2013, 2015) 
2.2 Sample selection 
 
Following Abdul Majid (2016), the present study imposed two criteria in obtaining the 
sample firms. First, we selected all firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia and Singapore stock 
exchanges that have goodwill from 2010-2012. Second, we selected firms that encountered 
declines in their market values below the book values of their net assets for three 
consecutive years from 2010 to 2012. These two criteria resulted in a small number of 
Singaporean listed firms (i.e., 52 firms with complete data). Thus, to ensure these firms are 
homogenous, this study undertakes a pair-matched analysis of Singaporean listed firms 
with Malaysian listed firms based on asset size and industry code.  
 
After excluding missing observations, overall, there are 104 listed firms (52 from each 
country) that fulfilled all the selection criteria. This study matched these firms based on 
industry and firm size because these attributes have been found to affect the policy choices 
of firms (Cairns et al., 2011).  




3. Results and discussion 
3.1 Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for all variables tested in the model. The table 
indicates that both Malaysia and Singapore listed firms that encountered declines in their 
market values below the book values of the net assets for three consecutive years have high 
book-to-market ratios. On average, the book-to-market ratio is 2.286 and 2.169 for 
Malaysia and Singapore listed firms, respectively. These firms also have a long CEO tenure 
and a smaller proportion of goodwill relative to the total assets. Moreover, both Malaysia 
and Singapore listed firms are very similar in size. This is expected due to the research 
design of this study, which would allow comparison of the data across the two countries.  
Table 1 
Comparative descriptive statistics and univariate tests 
 
 Malaysia (n = 52)  Singapore (n = 52)  
 Mean Median SD Mean Median SD 
DEBTRATIO 0.366 0.364 0.211 0.204 0.168 0.150 
CEOTENURE 11.437 9.292 8.525 13.388 10.875 9.562 
AUDITCOM 0.887 1.000 0.152 0.936 1.000 0.125 
GWB 0.051 0.020 0.071 0.056 0.018 0.089 
∆OCF 0.001 -0.009 0.068 -0.006 0.004 0.113 
SIZE 12.483 12.444 1.216 12.268 12.136 1.283 
BTM 2.286 1.816 1.190 2.169 1.878 1.237 
  
 All (both Malaysia and 
Singapore (n = 104)  
Test of differences 
(Malaysia vs. Singapore) 
 Mean Median SD Mean p value Median p value 
DEBTRATIO 0.285 0.240 0.200 0.000 0.000 
CEOTENURE 12.413 10.083 9.067 0.275 0.278 
AUDITCOM 0.912 1.000 0.141 0.076 0.077 
GWB 0.053 0.019 0.080 0.738 0.825 
∆OCF -0.003 -0.000 0.093 0.706 0.594 
SIZE 12.375 12.220 1.249 0.383 0.471 
BTM 2.228 1.837 1.210 0.624 0.495 
 
See Figure 1 for the variable definitions 




In comparing the sample data using the t-test and the Mann-Whitney U test, this study 
observed that the Malaysian listed firms have significantly higher leverage than the 
Singaporean listed firms. The Malaysian firms have a significantly lower proportion of 
independent directors on the audit committee than do the Singaporean firms. 
Table 2 reports the results of the Pearson correlation coefficients that are performed 
between variables employed in the study for the total sample that includes both Malaysian 
and Singaporean data. The table reveals that OWNCON and COUNTRY are highly 
correlated at 0.70. The high correlation between the two independent variables, which is 
more than 50% (Vaus (2002) indicates an issue of multicollinearity. To overcome this 
issue, OWNCON and COUNTRY are analysed in two separate regression equations.  
Table 2  
Pearson correlation coefficients  
 
 Variable  1 2 3 4 5 
1 GWIL(0,1) 1.00     
2 DEBTRATIO  0.32*** 1.00    
3 CEOTENURE -0.21** -0.06 1.00   
4 OWNCON 0.47*** 0.35*** -0.15 1.00  
5 AUDITCOM -0.26*** -0.00 0.05 -0.18 1.00 
6 GWB -0.07 -0.24** -0.12 -0.12 -0.06 
7 ∆OCF 0.03 0.03 0.05 -0.05 -0.07 
8 SIZE 0.06 0.38*** 0.07 0.18 -0.17 
9 BTM -0.02 0.18 -0.03 -0.02 0.21** 
10 COUNTRY -0.71*** -0.41*** 0.11 -0.70*** 0.18 
       
 
 
 Variable         6         7        8         9 
6 GWB 1.00    
7 ∆OCF 0.06 1.00   
8 SIZE -0.06 -0.13 1.00  
9 BTM -0.18 -0.08 0.22** 1.00 
10 COUNTRY 0.03 -0.04 -0.09 -0.05 
      
 
*, ** denote significance at the 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed) 
See Figure 1 for the variable definitions. 




3.2 Multivariate analysis: Results and discussion 
Table 3 reports the results of the logistic regression, which examine the motives and 
constraints to the recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment between 
listed firms in Malaysia and Singapore from 2010 to 2012.  Overall there are 3 main models 
– Models 1(a) and (b), Model 2 and Model 3.  
 
As noted earlier, due to the issue of multicollinearity, Model 1 is segregated into two – 
Model 1(a) tests the influence of the specific country while Model 1(b) tests the influence 
of ownership concentration. Models 1(a) and 1(b) report the regression results for the total 
sample that include listed firms in both countries while Models 2 and 3 report the 
regression results for listed firms in an individual country, i.e. Malaysia (Model 2) and 
Singapore (Model 3). In Model 1(a), the results show a Nagelkerke R square of 65.1% with 
a Chi-square of 69.487 (at p < 1%). The statistically significant results for Model 1(a) as 




In the present study, we test whether the motives and constraints to the recognition choice 
related to reporting zero goodwill impairment differs between Malaysian listed firms and 
Singaporean listed firms. We incorporate COUNTRY, which is a dummy variable equal 
one for Singaporean listed firms and zero for Malaysian listed firms. Table 3 shows that the 
COUNTRY is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that listed firms in Malaysia 
are more likely to exercise the recognition choice in reporting zero goodwill impairment 
than listed firms in Singapore.  




Table 3   
Regression results for the analysis of the recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment in two ASEAN countries 
  
 Model 1 - Full sample Individual country 
  Model 1(a) Model 1(b) Model 2 - Malaysia Model 3 - Singapore 
Variables Beta Wald Beta Wald Beta Wald Beta Wald 
Intercept 9.776 4.335** 5.794 2.639 11.646 0.838 14.849 3.166* 
LEVERAGE 1.535 0.589 3.481 4.791** -4.320 2.016 9.851 4.896** 
CEOTENURE -0.006 3.955* -0.003 2.021 -0.015 5.389** -0.006 1.655 
OWNCON - - 0.048 11.118*** -0.103 2.489 -0.008 0.063 
AUDITCOM -5.353 4.441** -4.857 5.769** -3.133 0.341 -9.499 4.391** 
GWB -4.675 1.610 -0.681 0.053 -21.009 4.746** -1.421 0.072 
∆OCF 0.450 0.021 0.973 0.129 4.305 0.151 -0.965 0.039 
SIZE -0.128 0.184 -0.277 1.40 0.320 0.171 -0.669 1.731 
BTM -0.178 0.367 0.011 0.003 0.306 0.214 -0.414 0.421 
COUNTRY -3.716 28.524**
* 
- - - - - - 
Model summary       
Hosmer-Lemeshow 0.546 0.546 0.568  
Chi-square 69.487*** 69.487*** 38.920***  
-2 Log likelihood 74.341 74.341 104.909  
Cox & Snell R square 48.7% 48.7% 31.2%  
Nagelkerke R square 65.1% 65.1% 41.7%  
 
*, ** denote significance at the 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively  
 
See Figure 1 for the variable definitions.  
 




To test the motives and constraints to the recognition choice, we formulate four main hypotheses - 
debt hypothesis, CEO reputation, ownership concentration and corporate governance mechanism. 
The debt hypothesis is tested using LEVERAGE. Table 3 shows that in Model 1(b), the coefficient 
on LEVERAGE is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that firms that are approaching 
their debt covenants are more likely not to take goodwill write-off (by reporting zero goodwill 
impairment) even though their market values dropped below the book values of the net assets for 
three consecutive years. Looking at the individual country, it is observed that the result is most 
likely come from Singaporean listed firms and not the Malaysian listed firms.  
 
The influence of CEO reputation is tested using CEOTENURE. Results show that in Model 1(a), 
the coefficient on CEOTENURE is negative and statistically significant. This result is contrary to 
the prediction set in H2. The statistically significant result is most likely come from Malaysian 
listed firms (see Model 2). The negative sign for the CEOTENURE suggests that, as the number of 
years a CEO held a position increases, there is a lower likelihood for listed firms in Malaysia to 
exercise the recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment.  
 
The influence of ownership concentration is tested using ownership interests held by the top five 
largest shareholders (OWNCON). Table 3 shows that in Model 1(b), the coefficient on OWNCON 
is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that as the level of ownership by the largest five 
shareholders increase, there is a higher likelihood for the sample firms to exercise the recognition 
choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment. 
 




The monitoring role of the audit committee is tested AUDITCOM, which is measured as the 
proportion of independent directors on the audit committee. Table 3 shows that in Model 1, the 
coefficient on AUDITCOM is negative and statistically significant. This result suggests that the 
higher the proportion of independent directors on the audit committee, the lower the probability of 
the sample firms to exercise the recognition choice. Model 3 shows that the statistically significant 
is most likely come from Singaporean listed firms. 
 
As for the control variables, Table 3 shows that none of the variables are statistically significant 
for the full sample (Models 1a and 1b). Nevertheless for the individual country, Model 2 shows 
that the coefficient on GWB is negative and statistically significant for the Malaysian result. This 
result suggests that the smaller the size of goodwill relative to the total assets (GWB), the higher 
the likelihood for the sample firms in Malaysia to exercise the recognition choice related to 
reporting zero goodwill impairment. Thus, the recognition choice is influenced by the small size of 
goodwill relative to the total assets. Other control variables, i.e., SIZE and BTM, are found to be 
non-significant, for listed firms in both Malaysia and Singapore.  
 
4. Conclusion  
In summary, this study compares motives and constraints to the recognition choice related to 
reporting zero goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed firms with those of Singaporean listed 
firms from 2010 to 2012. Listed firms in these two ASEAN countries apply similar IFRS related to 
goodwill impairment and share a similar market condition in that they encountered declines in 
their market values below the book values of the net assets for three consecutive years. Yet, 
regression results reveal that listed firms in both countries appear to have different potential 




motives and constraints to the recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment. 
The Singaporean results appear to suggest that the recognition choice related to reporting zero 
goodwill impairment is influenced by an attempt to avoid debt covenant violation. Meanwhile, a 
high ratio of independent directors on the audit committee appear to restrain such choice. 
Conversely, the Malaysian results appear to suggest that firms chose to exercise the recognition 
choice when the relative size of goodwill is small. However, the length of the CEO tenure appear 
to lessen such recognition choice.  
 
The results of this study contributes to the literature on accounting harmonization and IFRS 
implementation by providing empirical evidence and thus supporting the view that having similar 
accounting standards may not necessarily imply that the financial statements of listed firms in the 
two countries are entirely comparable. Other factors, in particular, firms’ reporting incentives and 
the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms play important roles in influencing the 
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